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Abstract The generation and distribution of disjointness effects raise a descrip-
tive and explanatory challenge to linguistic theories: what are the conditions un-
der which these effects arise and why do these effects arise in the first place? In
this paper, I flesh out an account of these effects that takes up both these chal-
lenges at once in showing that these effects are derivable from current approaches
to implicature-reasoning. In substance, it is argued that these effects follow from a
genuine implicature-based reasoning whose outcome may, upon certain contextual
pressures, result in conflicting representations, giving rise then to oddity effects.
The account is shown to unify various disjointness effects under one roof and to
explain the source of some of the classical conditions on co-reference and binding.
Keywords: disjointness effects, co-reference, variable binding, structural competition, scalar
implicatures, relevance, oddness, blindness, exhaustivity operator
1 Disjointness Effects
This paper is concerned with a set of well-known interpretative phenomenawhereby
two nominal expressions, whose interpretation could a priori co-refer or co-vary,
end up being interpreted as disjoint.1 Phenomenally, these interpretative effects,
known as disjointness effects, manifest themselves in two noticeable ways. First,
in run-of-the-mill contexts, we observe in examples like (1) that certain identity
relations between different nominals, occurring or not in the same sentence, are
spontaneously ruled out by speakers.
* This paper includes and extends some of the ideas and materials originally presented in Chapter 5 of
my doctoral dissertation, Implicatures in the DP domain. I am indebted to Irene Heim, Danny Fox
and David Pesetsky for sharing with me their invaluable insights on this topic over the years. I am
also thankful to my colleagues of the Semantics and Pragmatics group (FB IV) at ZAS, Itai Bassi,
Louise McNally, Sophie Moracchini, Despina Oikonomou, Philippe Schlenker, the reviewers and
audiences at SALT 28 for useful discussion and feedback at earlier stages of this work. This work
was supported by Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Grant Nr. 01UG1411).
1 We will say that a nominal expression α is interpreted as disjoint from a nominal expression β if the
interpretation of α does not — exhaustively or partially — co-refer with or co-vary with that of β .
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(1) a. The husband of John’s childhood sweetheart arrived.
 John is not the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart
b. John’s wife talked to Peter’s boss.
 John and Peter’s boss are distinct individuals
c. She criticized Sue’s work.
 Sue and she are distinct individuals
d.What is Sue gonna do?
 Sue is neither I (the speaker), nor you (the addressee)
Second, in cases where such semantic relationships are known to hold, the sen-
tences in (1) are perceived as deviant, as exemplified in (2).2 Hence, a sentence like
(2c) cannot felicitously be used to express the thought that Sue criticized her own
work, although the φ -features of she match those of Sue. Similarly, the sentence
in (2a) is unacceptable if it is known to the speakers that John married his child-
hood sweetheart, although nothing in the meaning of the description the husband
of John’s childhood sweetheart forces its denotation to be distinct from that of the
description John, as demonstrated by the fact that we can felicitously assert identity
statements such as The husband of John’s childhood sweetheart is John (himself).
(2) a. Context: John married his childhood sweetheart
# The husband of John’s childhood sweetheart arrived.
b. Context: John is Peter’s boss
# John’s wife talked to Peter’s boss.
c. Context: someone asked ‘What did Sue do?’
# SheSue criticized Sue’s work.
d.Context: Sue is the addressee of the speaker
# What is Sue gonna do?
While these examples only constitute a fragment of the data that a fully-fledged
theory of disjointness effects has to account for, they allow us to intuit the main chal-
lenges that any such theory has to take up. The first one pertains to the description of
the general conditions under which disjointness effects arise. In the past literature,
these effects have usually been broken down into distinct groups and subsumed
under different generalizations, e.g. the principles of the Binding Theory (Chom-
sky 1981, 1993; Lasnik 1989b), the so-called Crossover Constraints (Postal 1971;
Wasow 1972; Lasnik & Stowell 1991), Grodzinsky & Reinhart’s (1993) Rule I,
2 Here and throughout this paper, I use the symbol ‘#’ to indicate that a sentence is semantically
deviant in that it is perceived as odd by speakers. This characterization will be shown to be in line
with the analysis developed in this paper where such sentences are not ungrammatical per se, but
infelicitous due to the presence of an implicature conflicting with common knowledge.
367
Marty
Fox’s (2000) Rule H, Vergnaud’s (1974) Disjunction Condition later extended to
the ‘i-within-i’ Condition (Chomsky 1981), Schlenker’s (2005) Minimize Restric-
tors!. Yet it has also been noticed that some of these generalizations overlap in
terms of empirical coverage and can be either reduced to, or unified with one an-
other (a.o., Reinhart 1983; Grodzinsky & Reinhart 1993; Fox 2000; Büring 2005).
Hence, can we go one step further and propose a unified theory of these effects, one
from which all the valuable generalizations mentioned above would follow? Next,
beyond the descriptive level, the very existence of these effects also raises an ex-
planatory challenge, namely that of their raison d’être: why is it that certain identity
relations between nominals are systematically rejected by speakers, although those
relations are logically possible and pragmatically plausible?
In this paper, I offer an account of disjointness effects that takes up both these
challenges at once in deriving these effects from current approaches to implicature-
reasoning. The basic intuition underlying this account is that the core phenomenol-
ogy of disjointness effects is similar in essence to that of scalar implicatures (SIs).
First, in run-of-the-mill contexts, sentences like (3) are enriched by adding to their
logical representations the negation of one of their relevant, excludable alternatives,
ruling out in effect certain logical possibilities left open by their plain meaning.
(3) a. John gave an A to some of his students.
SI: ¬(John gave an A to all of his students)
b. John or Peter arrived.
SI: ¬(John and Peter both arrived)
c. John arrived.
SI: ¬(Peter arrived)
Second, in cases where the truth of the target alternatives is contextually known
to hold, these same sentences are now perceived as deviant by speakers, (4).
(4) a. Context: John gave the same grade to all his students
# John gave an A to some of his students.
b. Context: John and Peter are conjoined (Siamese) twins
# John or Peter arrived.
c. Context: John and Peter are conjoined (Siamese) twins
# John arrived.
To account for these and related observations, it has been proposed that (a) the
set of excludable alternatives entering the computation of SIs includes not just
stronger alternatives, but more generally non-weaker ones (a.o., Fox 2007; Chemla
& Spector 2011; Marty 2017), and that (b) the oddity effects in (4) result from the
presence of conflicting SIs (a.o., Magri 2009, 2011; Schlenker 2012; Marty 2017).
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In a nutshell, the sentences in (4) sound odd in context because their corresponding
alternatives are relevant and therefore the SIs associated with them are still com-
puted, thus resulting in contextually contradictory representations (e.g., John gave
an A to some, but not all of his students). Current theories of SIs featuring both (a)
and (b) end up with something along the lines of (5) as a general felicity condition:
(5) Felicity condition imposed by implicature reasoning
A sentence φ is felicitous at a contextC only if there is no sentence ψ s.t.
a. φ ’s plain meaning entails ψ in C, but
b. φ ’s strengthened meaning entails ¬ψ , i.e. if
i. ψ is a formal alternative to φ , and
ii.ψ is logically non-weaker than φ , and
iii.ψ is relevant inC.
In the following, I argue that, once supplemented with suitable mechanisms
for substituting and interpreting nominals in alternatives, theories of SIs provide
an explanatory account of a wide range of disjointness effects, subsuming under
(5) three core results from the literature on binding and co-reference: (I) reference
to the same individual via distinct but presupposedly coreferential descriptions is
dispreferred (Postal 1970; Heim 1982; Aloni 2001), (II) semantic binding is pre-
ferred over co-reference (Grodzinsky & Reinhart 1993), and (III) pronoun binding
seeks the closest antecedent (Fox 2000; Kehler 1993). The resulting account will
be shown to do justice to various insights from the past literature and in particular
to encompass the following familiar ideas: apparent syntactic restrictions on co-
reference and binding are in fact symptoms of semantic and pragmatic restrictions
(Bolinger 1977, 1979; Reinhart 1983; Levinson 1987, 2000; Schlenker 2005); the
generation of disjointness effects often relies on the availability of more minimal
alternatives and thus involves some form of manner considerations (Bolinger 1979;
Levinson 1987; Schlenker 2005); finally, identity relations are established by means
of co-dependent readings whenever possible (Evans 1980; Safir 2004, 2005).
2 Overview of the proposal
The proposal I will put forward is that disjointness effects follow from a genuine
implicature-based reasoning. To illustrate this proposal, let us consider the sentence
in (1a)/(2a). This sentence, repeated below in (6a), has (among others) the sentence
in (6b) as a competing alternative; one can verify that this alternative is derivable
from (6a) by substituting the whole subject DP with one of its sub-constituent DPs
and that it is logically independent from (6a).
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(6) a. The husband of John’s childhood sweetheart arrived.
[α the husband of [γ [β (the) John]’s child. sweet.]] arrived
b. John arrived.
[β (the) John] arrived
I argue that the comparison of (6a) to (6b) leads us to infer that the speaker
doesn’t believe that the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart and John are the
same individuals, regardless of whether (6b) is assumed to be relevant or irrelevant.
To explain this, let us consider both possibilities in turn. Suppose first that (6a) is
uttered in a context in which (6b) is relevant as well. Since (6b) is an excludable al-
ternative of (6a), the strengthened meaning of (6a) will entail the negation of (6b).
The resulting representation, together with the axioms of logic, gives us then the
disjointness inference we were interested in: if the husband of John’s childhood
sweetheart arrived but John didn’t, then both descriptions must denote distinct in-
dividuals on the speaker’s beliefs, as shown below.3
(7) [[EXHR [the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart arrived]]]
w
⇔ [[the husband of John’s child. sweet. arrived]]w∧¬[[John arrived]]w
∴ [[the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart]]w 6= [[John]]w
The presence of this implicature not only explains why this sentence is under-
stood as involving distinct individuals in run-of-the-mill contexts, but also why it
is perceived as infelicitous in cases where it is known that John married his own
childhood sweetheart, as in (2a). In such cases, (6a) and (6b) are contextually
equivalent; since relevance is closed under contextual equivalence, we have it that,
if (6a) is relevant, then so is (6b). The computation of the SI associated with (6b)
becomes then mandatory, resulting in a representation that contradicts speakers’
common assumptions, hence the oddness, consistent with the generalization in (5).
Turning to the second possibility, suppose now that we take (6b) to be irrelevant.
In this case, the implicature we just described cannot go through. But relevance
considerations still apply. Specifically, if (6a) is relevant but (6b) isn’t, then (6a) and
(6b) must not be contextually equivalent. This is possible only if (6a) and (6b) are
3 Here and throughout this paper, I adopt a grammatical view on SI-computation on which the SIs of
a sentence are computed recursively with the compositional side of meaning by applying a covert
but syntactically realized operator called the exhaustivity operator and notated EXH (a.o., Chierchia
2006; Fox & Hackl 2006; Fox 2007; Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2008; Fox & Spector 2009; Fox &
Katzir 2009; Magri 2011; Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012; Romoli 2012; Spector 2014; Magri 2014;
Marty 2017). Just like any other quantifier, the domain of quantification of EXH is hypothesized
to be restricted by a contextually assigned relevance predicate R, hence the notation EXHR . The
specifics of this operator will be discussed and refined in the following section. For now, we can
consider that applying EXHR to a proposition φ (i.e., its prejacent) outputs the truth of φ together
with the falsity of every excludable, structural alternative to φ that is relevant given φ (i.e., ψ ∈R).
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not true in all the same worlds compatible with the speakers’ common assumptions,
i.e. if it is not presupposed that the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart and
John refer to the same individual, as shown below.
(8) [[the husband of John’s child. sweet. arrived]] 6⇔C [[John arrived]]
∴ ∃w ∈C : [[the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart]]w 6= [[John]]w
Crucially, note that, on this alternative scenario, (6a) also gives rise to a disjoint-
ness inference, albeit a weaker one, namely that the speaker(s) do(es) not mutually
believe that the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart is John. Consequently,
(6a) should be felicitous only in contexts where the interlocutors believe that this
identity relation doesn’t hold or are uncertain as to whether it does, as in (9).4
(9) Context: A and B don’t know yet that John married his childhood sweetheart
A: Who did John’s childhood sweetheart marry?
B: I don’t know: maybe John himself, maybe someone else.
A:Well, I guess we’ll find out soon enough: the husband of John’s childhood
sweetheart just arrived.
In sum, whenever (6b) is relevant, (6a) gives rise to a (possibly mismatching)
implicature which leads us to infer that identity is believed to not hold; whenever
(6b) is irrelevant, this implicature disappears but we are then lead to infer that iden-
tity is not believed to hold; whichever is the case, it follows that (6b) can never felic-
itously express in context the meaning literally expressed by its alternative (6a). In
the next section, I lay down the specifics of this proposal by making explicit certain
assumptions about the structural complexity of nominals and then by discussing
in further detail the mechanisms whereby the set of alternatives is determined and
meaning strengthening performed. The empirical scope of the resulting account
will be discussed in Section 4. It will be shown that the SI-reasoning sketched out
in this overview applies to all the cases in (1)/(2).
4 Cases of overt disagreement like (i) can be seen as special cases of uncertainty, where uncertainty
arises at the inter-subjective level (i.e., interlocutors have conflicting opinions) creating a similar sit-
uation as in (9), i.e. the identity relation under discussion is not mutually accepted. I notice however
that, in the absence of such specific contexts of disagreement or mutual ignorance, which actively
depends upon the addressee’s epistemic state, the target of our inference tends to be narrowed down
from common knowledge to the speaker’s epistemic state, i.e. from ‘it is not common ground that
identity holds’ to ‘the speaker does not believe that identity holds’. This form of epistemic narrowing
has been discussed in Chemla 2008 and more recently in Rouillard & Schwarz 2017.
(i) Context: A and B are disagreeing about the identity of John’s wife
A: So John married his childhood sweetheart then?
B: No, he didn’t! He married Sue’s daughter!
A: Well, you can verify by yourself: ?the husband of John’s childhood sweetheart just arrived.
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3 Specifics of the proposal
3.1 Structural alternatives in the nominal domain
The present account relies on the idea that disjointness effects originate in the com-
parison of a given nominal with one of its alternatives, where the intended notion
of alternatives is that of structurally-defined alternatives developed in Katzir 2007
(see also Katzir 2008; Fox & Katzir 2011).5 When this comparison involves fully-
fledged definite descriptions as in (6), the structural relation is usually readable
from the surface forms: one can easily see that (6b) is a structural alternative to
(6a) while the reverse is not true, i.e. (6b).(6a) but (6a)6.(6b). The example in
(1b)/(2b), repeated below, offers further instances of transparent structural relations
between alternative descriptions of identical or lesser syntactic complexity.
(1b) John’s wife talked to [α [β (the) Peter]]’s boss]
a. John’s wife talked to [α [β (the) John]’s boss] by substitution within β
b. John’s wife talked to [β (the) John] by substituting further α with β
When it comes to pronouns, however, what appears on the surface is of little
help as a given phonological form may correspond to different structural realities.
Hence, to see how pronominal forms relate to other nominals and to each other,
we need to scratch the surface and look further into the details of their internal
composition. For space reasons, I will focus here on the case of 3rd person pronouns
(1st/2nd person pronouns will be discussed in 4.1). As a baseline for our metrics,
we can consider the basic structure of DPs to be as shown in (10): a genuine DP
consists of a determiner D and an NP made up of a nominal stem and a certain
number of meaningful nominal features (e.g., number, gender).
(10) Skeleton of genuine DPs: [DP Determiner [NP [N F1]. . . [N Fn] [N Stem]]]
e.g., every student, some girls, a man, (the) John, these people
In line with the previous literature, I will assume that the structure of pronouns
varies depending on whether they are referential or bound (a.o., von Stechow 2002;
Reinhart 2006; Heim 2008; Johnson 2012). On the one hand, I will follow the view
that (3rd person) referential pronouns are definite descriptions. This idea can be
implemented in at least two ways: one is to treat these descriptions as involving
at their core a variable, in the guise of a numerical index (a.o., Heim & Kratzer
5 In a nutshell, the set of structural alternatives for a syntactic structure φ , noted ALTstr(φ), is the
set of syntactic structures that are derivable from φ by a finite series of substitutions in φ — e.g.,
substitution of one terminal element for another terminal element, substitution of one constituent
with one of its sub-constituents — and that are therefore structurally at most as complex as φ , i.e.
ALTstr(φ) := {ψ : ψ . φ}. See Katzir (2007: (18)-(20)) for formal definitions and discussion.
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1998; Büring 2005; Heim 2005, 2007a,b; Adger 2011); another one is to treat them
as genuine DPs converted into pro-forms via nominal ellipsis, in the guise of N’-
ellipsis (a.o., Postal 1966; Elbourne 2001, 2005). For the time being, I will favor this
second option, restricting the use of indices to represent in the grammar the relation
of variable-binding, much in the spirit of Reinhart 1983, 2006. On this view, a
pronoun like she can be analyzed on its referential reading as in (11).6 Number
and descriptive features have their familiar lexical denotations. The feature [D def]
is interpreted like the definite determiner the in English, i.e. it maps a property of
individuals to the maximal individual that has that property (a.o., Link 1983).
(11) The student/shethe student arrived.
a. Syntax: [DP [def] [NP [sg][fem][student]]]NOMINATIVE
b. Meaning: the individual x s.t. x is an atom & x is female & x is student
c. Plain vs. Phonologically reduced descriptions:
i. {[def]} {[sg], [fem], [student]}→ ‘the student’/_ NOMINATIVE
ii. {[def], [sg], [fem]} student → ‘she’/_ NOMINATIVE
On the other hand, we will take bound pronouns to be ‘minimal pronouns’ in
the sense of Kratzer: a bound pronoun consists at LF of a bare index, which upon
semantic binding, inherits feature values from the DP that binds it (a.o., Kratzer
1998; von Stechow 2002, 2003; Schlenker 2003; Heim 2008; Kratzer 2009; Johnson
2012). On this view, the features appearing on bound pronouns only contribute to
how these pronouns are spelled out. For concreteness, I will implement this idea by
following the proposal in Johnson 2012 and treat indices as nominal features (e.g.,
[N 1], [N 2], [N 3]), hereby letting them access the features of their binders under
agreement. These indices are treated at LF as variables and are interpreted as usual
via variable assignments (i.e., [[[n]]]g = g(n)). Note that, in this system, a derivation
can converge at the interfaces only if every index that occurs in it is bound.
On these assumptions, the intended reading of a sentence like (12) can in prin-
ciple obtain from two distinct representations, depending on whether the identity
relation between her and the subject DP is established by co-reference, (12a), or by
variable-binding, (12b). In the first case, the pronoun is referential: it is syntactially
construed as a genuine description and undergoes N’-ellipsis at PF; in the second
case, it is bound: it comes solely with an index and receives from its binder the
features it needs to be pronounced at PF.
6 NP-ellipsis (or rather N’-ellipsis) is implicitly assumed to be subject to certain pragmatic conditions.
In particular, in our cases, the result of NP-ellipsis should comply with the general constraints that
rule the felicitous use of pro-forms. For instance, the use of she in (11) is felicitous only if the con-
text allows the addressee to recover enough of the elided descriptive content to establish reference.
This recoverability-based restriction can be thought of as an equivalent of Heim & Kratzer’s (1998)
Appropriateness Condition on the alternative treatment of referential pronouns as free variables.
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(12) The student criticized herthe student work.
a. (Co)-Referential representation
[SUBJECT]7{sg, fem} . . . [vP t7 . . . [[DP [def] [NP [sg][fem][student]]]’s work]
b. Bound variable representation
[SUBJECT]7{sg, fem} . . . [vP t7 . . . [[NP [7]]’s work]
BINDING+AGREE
It is crucial to observe that the above construals are structurally related to each
other in a non-symmetric fashion: the bound-variable construal in (12b) is a struc-
tural alternative to the co-referential construal in (12a), while the reverse is not true
since (12a) is more complex than (12b). More generally, on this analysis, one can
observe that (i) a referential expression occurring in an environment in which it
could be semantically bound always compete with a simpler bound-variable alter-
native, and that (ii) by our metrics, a bound pronoun (i.e., an index) can only have
other bound pronouns (i.e., other indices) as structural alternatives. We shall later
see that it is essentially these two properties that drive the competition which result
in Rule I and Rule H effects. One question then remains to be addressed: what
indices do we consider when deriving the alternatives of a sentence? As the present
system does not allow indices to have free occurrences at the global level, we shall
minimally assume that their introduction is guided by the rule in (13).
(13) Substitution rule for indices: a numerical index i is in the substitution
source of a structure φ only if i already occurs in φ (i.e., i occurs on a poten-
tial binder or else on a trace left by the movement of a potential binder).
We shall now explain how such competitions between nominals interact with
meaning strengthening and contribute to determine the range of contexts in which
a sentence like (12) can be used felicitously.
3.2 Excludability, relevance and exhaustification
As previewed in fn. 3, I adopt the view that meaning strengthening is performed
in the grammar via the application of a syntactic operator called the exhaustivity
operator, notated EXHR . The conceptualization of EXHR I will follow is essentially
that proposed in Magri 2009, 2011, 2014, which relies on three axioms. The first
one is that an occurrence of EXHR is present in syntax at every scope site (recursive
exhaustification is only optional). For instance, in (14) and (15), EXHR occurs at the
two scope sites available, ① and ②, corresponding roughly to the TP and vP level.
In line with our analysis, note that these sentences have bound-variable alternatives
in common, namely those alternatives containing the vP [t7 v criticize [7]’s work]].
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(14) The student criticized Sue’s work.
EXHR [① [the student]
7 TPAST EXHR [② t7 v criticize [(the) Sue]’s work]]
ALTstr(②): [t7 v criticize [7]’s work]]
(15) (#) SheSue criticized Sue’s work.
EXHR [① [she Sue]
7 TPAST EXHR [② t7 v criticize [(the) Sue]’s work]]
ALTstr(②): [t7 v criticize [7]’s work]]
The second axiom is that the notion of entailment relevant for determining the
set of excludable alternatives is that of logical entailment (see also Fox & Hackl
2006; Chierchia et al. 2008, 2012). For our purposes, we will take the excludable
alternatives to a sentence φ to be those structural alternatives to φ that are logically
non-weaker than φ (i.e., not entailed by φ ). Since EXHR can occur at embedded
levels, we also need to specify how excludability is computed for representations
involving indices that are not semantically bound locally, as above. My proposal is
that the computation of excludable alternatives is blind to the actual values of all
contextual parameters of evaluation: a structural alternative ψ to a sentence φ is ex-
cludable if there is a possible valuation of the parameters of evaluation (i.e., world
of evaluation, variable assignment, context of evaluation) that makes the falsity of
ψ consistent with the truth of φ . This notion of extended blindness can be imple-
mented as in (16a). As usual, the set of excludable alternatives associated with a
sentence φ , EXCL(φ), is further restricted to the subset of ‘innocently excludable’
alternatives (a.o., Fox 2007), IE(φ). The semantics for EXHR is given in (16c).
(16) Extended blindness, innocent exclusion and exhaustification




{EXCL’(φ) : EXCL’(φ)⊆ EXCL(φ) and EXCL’(φ) is a max. subset of EXCL(φ)}
c. [[EXHR φ ]]
w,c,g := [[φ ]]w,g,c∧∀ψ ∈ IE(φ) : (¬[[ψ]]w,g,c∨ [[ψ]]w,g,c /∈R)
Crucially, this characterization of EXHR makes it applicable to propositions
involving free individual variables at embedded levels. For instance, we can verify
that the bound-variable alternatives to (14)/(15) are locally excludable: that g(7)
criticized Sue’s work in w does not logically entail that g(7) criticized g(7)’s work
in w for there is a possible world w and assignment g that assigns to index 7 a
value distinct from the denotation of Sue in w. Strengthening the meaning of these
sentences at embedded levels delivers the following result:
(17) [[EXHR [② t7 v criticize [(the) Sue]’s work]]]]
w,g,c is true iff
a. [[[t7 v criticize [(the) Sue]’s work]]]]
w,g,c is true, and (prejacent)
b. [[[t7 v criticize [7]’s work]]]]
w,g,c is false or irrelevant (strenghtening)
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The third and last axiom concerns the process whereby we evaluate the rel-
evance of an alternative to determine whether the disjunctive inference obtained
upon exhaustification is strengthened to what we properly call a scalar implicature.
Following Magri’s proposal, we will assume that, by default, the prejacent φ of
EXHR is always relevant simply by virtue of being asserted, i.e. φ ∈R. Since rel-
evance is closed under contextual entailment, any alternative ψ to φ that makes
the same contribution as φ in context is also relevant, i.e. if φ ∈ R and ψ ⇔C φ ,
then ψ ∈ R. In such cases, the SI associated to that alternative is mandatory. It
is expected to be so in examples like (17) whenever the value that g(7) receives
by composition ends up contextually indistinguishable from the denotation of Sue.7
As in the case discussed in Section 2, the interpretation of (17) leaves us with two
possible scenarios, both of which result in the generation of a disjointness inference.
i. Strong disjointness: If (17b) is relevant, then the target SI obtains, i.e. The
student/SheSue didn’t criticize her (own) work, and disjointness follows. In
the example in (15), since (17a)⇔C(17b), this SI is mandatory and results
in a contradictory representation. An utterance of (15) is thus predicted to
be trivially false in context, hence infelicitous (i.e., (15)∩C = /0).
(15) Context: Sue had to comment on her essay for a class.
# SheSue criticized Sue’s work.
Conflicting SI: # SheSue didn’t criticize her own work
ii. Weak disjointness: If (17b) is irrelevant, then (17b)6⇔C(17a). This alterna-
tive scenario is possible in (14). In this case, it must not be presupposed that
the student and Sue refer to the same individual. Consequently, a sentence
like (14) is predicted to be felicitous only in contexts where some uncer-
tainty remains as to whether both descriptions refer to the same person, as
in (18) for instance where identity is questioned rather than presupposed.
(18) A: Is the student over there Sue?
B: I believe so: XThis student/Shethe student is wearing Sue’s coat.
In the next section, I show that this implicature-based approach to disjointness
effects applies in full generality and offers an explanatory account of (some of) the
classical descriptive generalizations proposed in the previous literature.
7 For our purposes, the procedure for determining whether a sentence is contextually equivalent to one
of its alternatives at embedded levels can be stated as follows. Let [φ . . .EXHR [ψ . . .]] be any sentence
where ψ is a constituent in φ with a propositional type. An alternative χ to ψ is contextually equiv-
alent to ψ in φ if and only if their plain contextual contributions are equivalent, i.e. iff [φ . . . [χ . . .]]
is contextually equivalent to [φ . . . [ψ . . .]]. One can verify by this procedure that (15) is contextually
equivalent to its bound-variable alternative at the embedded level, ②, hence its infelicity.
376
Disjointness Effects as Implicatures
4 Empirical Coverage
4.1 Don’t multiply guises: ‘i-within-i’ and related effects
It has long been observed that a nominal expression cannot co-refer with any an-
other description that contains it, as stated and exemplified in (19) (a.o., Vergnaud
1974; Higginbotham&May 1981; Brody 1982; Jullens 1983;Williams 1982; Chom-
sky 1981; Hoeksema & Napoli 1990; Chomsky 1993; Jacobson 1994).8
(19) The ‘i-within-i’ Condition: *[α . . . [β ] j. . . ] j
No description may co-refer with a description that contains it.
a. # [The husband of [John] j’s childhood sweetheart] j arrived.
b. # [[John] j’s financial advisor’s coach] j is a former Marine.
c. # Mary met [the famous author of [D.Brown] j’s books] j.
d. # John is dating [the mother of the son of [this woman] j] j.
In the theories of Chomsky 1981, Lasnik 1989a and Webelhuth 1995, the ‘i-
within-i’ Condition is stipulated and conceived as a primitive of the grammar. It
shall be clear by now that the present theory offers a rationale for the source of
these effects (see Section 2) : ‘i-within-i’ sentences all have, by definition, simpler
structural alternatives which are contextually equivalent to them, yet not logically
entailed by them. The representations resulting from their strengthened meanings
are thus always contradictory with common knowledge, hence their oddness.
Crucially, our account predicts that the logic underlying the generation of these
effects shall not be specific to the ‘i-within-i’ environment so to speak. Specifically,
we expect such oddity effects to be found whenever a given referential expression
presupposedly co-refers with one of its (simpler) structural alternatives. The ex-
amples in (20) and (21) show that this expectation is indeed borne out. Note that,
in these examples, structural complexity breaks symmetry: the (b)-sentences are
structural alternatives to the (a)-sentences while the reverse is not true. I refer the
reader to Marty (2017: chapter 5) for a discussion of the generality of this finding.
(20) Context: John is Mary’s assistant
a. # [[John] j’s boss] gave [[Mary]’s assistant] j a raise
b. [[John] j’s boss] gave [John] j a raise
8 Subscript letters ( j,k, l, . . .) are used informally in the following to represent presupposed corefer-
ence and thus to clarify the state of the common ground. Presupposed co-reference is understood as
follows: any two referential expressions α and β are presupposed to be co-referential at a contextC
just in case α and β pick up the same individual in each world inC (a.o., Heim 1982, 1998, 2007a).
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(21) Context: Sue is married, and she and her husband have a son.
a. # [[Sue] j’s boss] talked to [the father of [her] j son]k (ok if divorced)
b. [[Sue] j’s boss] talked to [[her] j husband]k
Pursuing this idea further, I propose that the disjointness inferences triggered by
the use of 3rd person referential expressions relative to the speaker and addressee
of the utterance context (see (1d)/(2d)) follow from a similar kind of competition,
one involving 1st and 2nd person pronouns. Following Kratzer’s (2009) proposal,
1st and 2nd referential pronouns can be analyzed as in (22), where nominal 1st and
2nd person features are treated as irreducibly referential.9 On this analysis, 1st/2nd
referential pronouns are thus, in terms of structural complexity, between 3rd person
referential expressions (more complex) and bound indices (least complex). A brief
comparison of (11) vs. (22) allows us to verify that 1st/2nd referential pronouns
asymmetrically compete with 3rd person referential expressions.
(22) a. Syntax: [NP [sg][1st]]NOMINATIVE arrived
b. Meaning: the atomic speaker in c arrived
c. PF: {[sg], [1st]}→ ‘I’/_ NOMINATIVE
Recall that, on our view, the computation of excludable alternative is blind to all
contextual parameters of evaluation, including to the information pertaining to the
‘objective’ utterance context (e.g., identity of the interlocutors, utterance time and
place). A sentence like (23) is thus predicted to give rise to a variety of disjointness
inferences, preventing both John and Mary from being denotationally identical to
the speaker or addressee and therefore giving rise to oddity effects in contexts where
it would be assumed to be otherwise.
(23) John is looking at Mary
a. EXHR [φ [(the) {sg, masc} John]
7 [t7 is looking at [(the) {sg, fem}Mary]]]
b. ALTstr(φ):{[{sg, 1st}]
7 [t7 am looking at 7],
[{sg, 1st}]7 [t7 am looking at [{sg, 2nd}]],
[{sg, 2nd}]7 [t7 are looking at [{sg, 1st}]],
[{sg, 2nd}]7 [t7 are looking at 7]}
Implicatures: I am not looking at myself & I am not looking at you & you
are not looking at yourself & you are not looking at me.
9 See Siewierska 2004 for evidence of the special status of 1st/2nd person referential pronouns in many
pronominal languages. As Kratzer (2009: p.220) emphasized, one indication of this special status
is that speakers and listeners are normally only referred to by person markers, whereas reference to
any other things or individuals can, and in some languages must, be achieved via demonstratives or
full-fledged definite descriptions.
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Our theory thus derives the ‘i-within-i’ Condition and, more generally, the con-
straint that reference to the same object via two distinct guises is possible only as
long as the speaker(s) treat(s) it as an open question whether the same object is be-
hind these two guises (a.o., Postal 1970; Heim 1982; Aloni 2001). Consistent with
the scope of our proposal, we have provided evidence that this constraint applies in
full generality, beyond the restricted area of the ‘i-within-i’ environment.
4.2 Binding over co-reference: Rule I and Binding Principles
Several generalizations have been proposed to capture the observation that identity
relations between nominals is preferentially expressed by means of co-dependent
rather than co-referential readings. This preference is remotely articulated in the
Binding Theory where Principle C prevents a referential expression from co-referring
with an expression that c-commands it and interacts with Principle A and B to favor
in such cases the use of more dependent forms, i.e. reflexive forms in local environ-
ments and pronouns elsewhere. It is explicitly stated in Grodzinsky & Reinhart’s
(1993) Rule I, where it takes the form of a competition at LF between co-referential
vs. bound-variable construals (see Büring (2005) for discussion).
(24) Rule I: An NP β cannot corefer with an NP α if replacing β with γ , γ a
variable semantically bound by α , yields an indistinguishable interpretation.
a. Co-reference: ∗[α]7j . . . [t7. . . [β ] j. . . ]
b. Variable-binding: X[α]7j . . . [t7. . . [var7]. . . ]
The present account derives this generalization and explains its raison d’être.
Co-referential construals of the form in (24a) structurally compete with simpler
bound-variable construals of the form in (24b) that are contextually equivalent to
them and yet locally excludable (see 3.1 and 3.2). On our account, such constru-
als generate a conflicting implicature, one that falsifies an identity relation that is
contextually known to hold, and are thus predicted to be semantically deviant, (25),
consistent with the felicity condition in (5). By contrast, variable-binding offers a
more minimal structural way to express an identity relation between two nominals,
while preventing it from being defeated upon implicature reasoning.
(25) # [α]7j . . . EXHR [φ . . . t7. . . [β ] j. . . ] Rule I
a. [ψ . . . t7. . . 7. . . ] is a simpler structural alternative to φ , and
b. ψ is innocently excludable, and
c. ψ and φ are contextually equivalent, hence ψ ∈R
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More generally, in a similar vein as Rule I, the present account predicts that a
sentence φ is felicitous at a context C only if, for any two nominals α and β in φ ,
if α could but does not semantically bind β , then the alternative to φ that obtains
by replacing β with an index semantically bound by α makes a contribution in C
distinct from that of φ . Whether it is so ultimately depends on whether α and β
denote the same individual on speakers’ conversational assumptions (a.o., Postal
1970; Heim 1982; Higginbotham 1980) as well as on additional considerations re-
lated to disambiguation strategies (see Schlenker 2005 for discussion).10
This theorem subsequently captures the effects subsumed under Principle C and
can further capture those subsumed under Principle A and B on certain assumptions.
On our view, one way to think of the contrast in (26) is to assume that the morpho-
phonology of English (and of many other languages) distinguishes referential from
bound pro-forms in certain environments. In other words, speakers know from the
phonology that me/you/him/her/it are not possible spell-outs of an index whose φ -
features are valued via agreement with a local DP, and thus know just from the
surface forms that those pro-forms can only be construed as free referential expres-
sions in sentences like (26a), hence the resulting disjointness effect.
(26) a. # [John]7j{sg, masc} praised [him{sg, masc} John] j
XFree, ∗Local Agree
b. [John]7j{sg, masc} praised [himself7]
∗Free, XLocal Agree
BINDING+AGREE
Now, our account also makes certain predictions that are beyond the scope of
Rule I and the Binding Principles. Consider for instance the sentence in (27). On
its intended reading, this sentence sounds odd because it suggests that Mary and her
brother have different mothers (it is ok then if Mary and her brother are step/half-
siblings). Crucially, neither Rule I, nor Principle C capture this disjointness effect:
in this sentence, neither of the descriptions that could be semantically bound by
the subject [Mary’s brother] co-refers with it. It is explained however on our ac-
count: the referential expression [[her Mary] mother]] competes with a simpler
bound-variable alternative, e.g. [[7]’s mother], which ends up denoting the same
individual as [[her Mary] mother]] once bound by the subject [Mary’s brother].
(27) # [[Mary]k’s brother] j talked to [[her]k mother]l .
a. LF: [TP [Mary’s brother]
7 EXHR [vP t7 talked to [her Mary] mother]]
10 For instance, a speaker may prefer to repeat a fully-fledged description (e.g., John told Bill that Luke
talked to John’s mother) instead of using a bound pronoun (i.e., John told Bill that Luke talked to
his mother) to avoid some referential ambiguity that may have arisen from using that pronoun (e.g.,
multiple potential antecedents: John, Bill and Luke). These disambiguation strategies can be inte-
grated to our account if we assume that the conditions imposed on the felicitous use of pronouns are
taken into account when evaluating whether an alternative would make or not a distinct contextual
contribution. Avoiding a referential ambiguity in context seems like a good tie-breaker.
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b. ALTstr(vP): [vP t7 talked to [7]’s mother]
Conflicting SI: # Mary’s brother didn’t talk to his own mother
Another important prediction of our theory is that the preference for semantic
binding should always be relativized to structural complexity. Hence, a bound nom-
inal expression may still compete with a referential one if it is structurally simpler.
The example in (28) shows that this prediction is borne out: in this sentence, the
co-dependent expression [7’s ex-boy-friend] competes with a simpler alternative,
namely [John], which happens to denote the same individual as [7’s ex-boy-friend]
upon semantic binding by the subject [John’s ex-girlfriend]. Once again, the odd-
ness of (28) is left unaccounted for by Rule I and the Binding Theory.
(28) # [[John]k’s ex-girlfriend] j bumped into [her ex-boyfriend]k
a. LF: [TP [John’s ex-girlfriend]
7 EXHR [vP t7 bumped into [7’s ex-boyfriend]]
b. ALTstr(vP): [t7 bumped into [John]]
Conflicting SI: # John’s ex-girlfriend didn’t bump into John
In sum, our theory derives the preference to have binding in environments where
binding is possible, and offers a rationale for the competition between co-referential
vs. bound-variable construals at the core of Rule I. In addition, it offers fine-grained
predictions regarding the competition between these construals in environments
where neither Rule I, nor the Binding Principles apply.
4.3 Transitive binding over co-binding: Rule H and Crossover Effects
Another important generalization from the past literature is that co-binding is gen-
erally dispreferred to transitive binding: if an NP is construed as a bound variable,
then it must be bound to the closest antecedent possible. A well-known formulation
of this locality condition on variable binding is Fox’s (2000) Rule H, (29), which
has been invoked for instance to account for a number of otherwise puzzling facts
about ellipsis resolution, including ‘Dahl’s puzzle’ (see Fox 2000: chapter 4).11
(29) Rule H: A pronoun α can be bound by an antecedent β only if there is no
closer antecedent γ such that it is possible to bind α to γ and get the same
semantic interpretation.
a. Co-binding: ∗[α]7. . . [[var7]
8. . . [var7]. . . ]
b. Transitive binding: X[α]7. . . [[var7]
8. . . [var8]. . . ]
11 A linking condition very similar to Rule H is also proposed in Kehler (1993: (26)): A referential
element is linked to the most immediate coreferential element that c-commands it in the syntax.
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To illustrate, consider the sentence in (30). Among the conceivable LFs that
could express a reading on which this sentence means ‘The boy said that the boy
criticized the boy’s mother’, Rule I only allows (30a) and (30b), and Rule H further
rules out (30a) in favor of (30b).
(30) The boyi said that hei criticized hisi mother.
a. ∗[the boy]7 [t7 said that [he7]
8 [φ t8 criticized his7 mother]]
b. X[the boy]7 [t7 said that [he7]
8 [ψ t8 criticized his8 mother]]
Our account also explains the raison d’être of this competition. In (30a), the
embedded sentence φ has the sentence ψ in (30b) as a structural alternative, which
obtains from φ by replacing a (bound) index with another (bound) index available
in φ ’s substitution source (by contrast, note that φ is not derivable from ψ since 7 is
not in ψ’s substitution source). At all levels, this alternative is contextually equiv-
alent to ψ and, since it is locally excludable, it must be excluded. Upon meaning
strengthening, the SI associated with this alternative is thus computed, resulting in a
contradictory representation, i.e. #The boy said that he criticized his own mother but
not his own mother. On our view then, (i) binding is the privileged way to express
and preserve identity relations in the grammar (Rule I), and (ii) transitive binding is
the optimal way to preserve these relations throughout the derivation (Rule H).
(31) # [α]7. . . [7]8. . . EXHR [φ t8. . . [7]. . . ] Rule H
a. [ψ t8. . . [8]. . . ] is a structural alternative to φ , and
b. ψ is innocently excludable, and
c. ψ and φ are contextually equivalent, hence ψ ∈R
This line of explanation extends to the Strong Crossover (SCO) effects. The
SCO construal, just like the co-binding construal above, is one in which a conflict-
ing implicature is predicted to systematically arise (since contextual equivalence
always obtains). This result is exemplified in (32) where the relevant vP-alternative
has the same structure as the vP in Every boy criticized his mother on its co-varying
interpretation, namely [every boy]8 [t8 criticized his8 mother].
(32) #Hei criticized every boyi’s mother.
#SCO
a. LF: [every boy]7 [he7]
8 EXHR [vP t8 criticized t7’s mother]
b. ALTstr(vP): [t8 criticized [8]’s mother]
Conflicting SI: # Every boy didn’t criticize his own mother
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Interestingly, I notice that this account does not extend to the Weak Crossover
(WCO) construals, (33), which are treated on a par with sentences like Hisi mother
criticized Johni (Possible SI: But she didn’t criticize herself ) or like Every boyi’s
mother criticized himi (Possible SI: But every boy’s mother didn’t criticize herself ).
Crucially, these sentences may give rise to implicatures, but those implicatures are
not mandatory and do not result in contradictory representations.
(33) Hisi (own) mother criticized every boyi.
XWCO
a. LF: [every boy]7 [his7 mother]
8 EXHR [vP t8 criticized t7]
b. ALTstr(vP): [ψ t8 criticized [8]]
Possible SI: Every boy’s mother didn’t criticize herself
In sum, our theory derives Rule H through the requirement to have local binding
and offers a rationale for the competition between co-binding vs. transitive binding.
This theory further accounts for the unavailability of variable-binding in SCO con-
struals and, in that respect, draws a clear line between those construals and the
WCO construals. The merit of this last result is left to the reader.
5 Conclusion
The present approach offers a rationale for the existence of disjointness effects and,
by uncovering their underlying logic, permits to subsume under one roof several
descriptive generalizations from the previous literature. This result is achieved at
minimal costs by elaborating on two ideas which exist inchoately in the literature.
The first one is that nominals compete with each other on the basis of their struc-
tural complexity and that these competitions lay the groundwork for implicature-
reasoning (e.g., referential expressions vs. bound pronouns, complex co-dependent
vs. simpler referential expressions, more complex vs. simpler definite description).
The second concerns the depart between contextual and logical information in com-
puting implicatures: the relevance of an alternative depends upon contextual consid-
erations, including speakers’ extra-linguistic knowledge of co-referential relations,
whereas its excludability is determined on the sole basis of logical considerations,
with only access to those identity relations that are encoded in the grammar proper.
To the best of my knowledge, the resulting theory achieves an empirical coverage of
the disjointness effects never reached before. Further investigations are still needed
however to fully evaluate the empirical scope of this theory and in particular to
assess which effects of a similar kind it can account for and which ones are to be at-
tributed to other grammatical constraints or other forms of pragmatic reasoning. An
in-depth study of cross-sentential disjointness effects and of their possible treatment
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